![]() ![]() There are several dirt roads in this area too, but it’s unclear whether they’re currently passable for wheeled military equipment. The only paved road connecting Bakhmut with the “mainland” Ukraine is the road through Khromove towards Chasiv Yar.The bridge across the canal connecting Siverskyi Donets River with the Donbas along that highway has been blown up, which makes the road unusable for supply to Bakhmut. ![]() In the south, the mercenary group is advancing towards the Bakhmut–Kostyantynivka highway and the village of Ivanivske.The capture of Krasna Hora in the north threatens the Ukrainian positions in Paraskoviivka and along the Bakhmut–Slovyansk highway. Wagner Group forces have concentrated on clasping the city from the north and south.Kyiv’s goal appears to be a counteroffensive in the spring (with invigorated forces).įor the time being, it seems likely that Ukraine will lose Bakhmut in the course of its efforts to deplete Wagner Group - a mercenary corps of several dozen thousand troops and its own armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and aviation. The Ukrainian command, meanwhile, remains faithful to its strategy of exhausting Russia’s forces to win time for more arms deliveries from the West. The most that can be achieved at this rate of success is to distract the Ukrainian army from accumulating the forces sufficient for a counteroffensive. Nor can the Russian assaults be described as usually successful: the marines of Russia’s Pacific Fleet have lost dozens of tanks and fighting vehicles near Vuhledar. While the Ukrainian military has great difficulty in holding back Wagner Group formations around Bakhmut and in resisting the elite airborne units near Kreminna, Kyiv’s troops have been quite successful in deflecting the Russian joint forces’ attacks outside Vuhledar and Marinka.Īs a result, the Russian offensive has devolved into a series of localized battles, without any apparent unifying plan. Russia’s first Donbas offensive since the New Year has made clear that the Russian armed forces have not solved their tactical problems, remaining disparate and uneven in terms of different units’ combat power. Meduza’s goal is not to track the conflict in real time the data reflected on the map are typically at least 48 hours old. We collect reports already available publicly and determine their geolocation markers, adding only the photos and videos that clear this process. Our map is based exclusively on previously published open-source photos and videos, most of them posted by eyewitnesses on social media. As part of this commitment, we regularly update an interactive map that documents combat operations in Ukraine and the damage inflicted by Russia’s invasion forces. Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Meduza has adopted a consistent antiwar position, holding Russia responsible for its military aggression and atrocities. ![]()
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